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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The appellant's major argument is that the Utah Medical
Practices Act is overbroad and void for vagueness such that
the Act has no real meaning.
in conflict.

The facts in the case are not

The interpretation of the Act and its application

is appellant's legal argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Medical Practices Act, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended 58-12-30 (4) (a) is overbroad as applied in
defining the practice of medicine as the testimony does not
support the conviction of Mr. Hoffman if the practice of
medicine is defined in Section 58-12-30 (4) (a) (b) and (c).
Appellant herein attacks the Act as overbroad and void for
vagueness as applied by the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant Wendall Hoffman was tried and convicted
of the unlawful practice of medicine, a violation of the
Medical Practices Act, Utah Code Annotated as amended, 1953,
58-12-30, a third degree penalty.

Mr. Hoffman was sentenced

by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on February 5, 1986.

The

sentence imposed was a 0 - 5 year prison term and a fine of
$3,100.

There was a stay of execution of the prison term

and the defendant was placed on probation.

The appellant

seeks a reversal and argues that inter alia the Medical
Practices Act is void for vagueness and overbroad on its
face and as it applies to appellant.

-1-

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury in the Second District Court returned a guilty
verdict and the appellant was convicted of a third degree
felony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction because
the Medical Practices Act is overbroad as applied and on
its face.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State established its case by the testimony of two
witnesses - Robert Bowen who testified that Mr. Hoffman did
not now nor did he ever have a license to practice medicine.
The second witness, Phyllis Frankel, testified that she
was an investigator for Consumer Protection which is part
of Business Regulations.

There is little dispute in the

facts of the case.
Mrs. Frankel, using an assumed name, wrote a letter
that reached the appellant.

In the letter she claimed she

had stomach pains and that she did not feel well.
what could be done with her problem.

She asked

She further stated that

Mr. Hoffman had helped a friend of hers in the past.
As a response to her letter, she was told that she had
10,000 negative energy, that there was some kind of.arsenic
content in her stomach and that her white blood count was
down.

Prior to sending the letter, Mrs. Frankel called

Mr. Hoffman's place of business and she was told to send a

-2-

donation of $60.00.
On August 1, 1985, Mrs. Frankel went to the office of
Energy Evaluation and Research at 86 0 West Riverdale in
Ogden.

While she was at the office she spent about 45 minutes

with Mr. Hoffman.

She claimed that she still didnft feel

well and that she was sick to her stomach.

Mr. Hoffman was

puzzled that she should still have stomach pains because he
had energy projections to help her condition.
Mr. Hoffman asked Mrs. Frankel to write her name on a
piece of paper and he held a swinging pendulum over the
paper.

He indicated that Mrs. Frankel had three ulcers.

Mr. Hoffman indicated that she should cleanse her food in
a clorox water solution.

He also recommended that

Mrs. Frankel purchase some pills for $25.00 to help her
condition.
pills.

Subsequently Mrs. Frankel did purchase the

Mrs. Frankel also indicated that if at anytime she

was not satisfied that the $60.00 would be refunded to her.
POINT I
THE STATE OF UTAH LACKED AUTHORITY TO
PROCEED WITH A FELONY ACTION BECAUSE OF
ITS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH MEDICAL
PRACTICES ACT.
The appellant was convicted under the Medical Practice
Act, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953, 58-12-26 et. seq.
The Act is primarily a licensing statute governed by the
Department of Business Regulations which sets the standards
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of who shall practice medicine in the State of Utah.

The

relevant parts of the Act consists of three different
sections.

They are cited as follows:

(1) Utah Code Annotated - 58-12-28(4)(a)(b)(c):
(4) "Practice of Medicine" means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury,
infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition,
physical or mental, real or imaginary, or to attempt
to do so by any means or instrumentality;
(b) to maintain an office or place of business
for the purpose of doing any of the acts described in
Subsection

(a) whether or not for compensation;

(c) to use in the conduct of any occupation
or profession pertaining to the diagnosis or treatment
of human diseases or conditions in any printed material;
stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs, advertisements,
the designation "doctor," "doctor of medicine,"
"physician," "surgeon," "physician and surgeon," "Dr.,"
"M.D.," or any combination of these designations,
unless the designation additionally contains the
description of the branch of the healing arts for
which the person has a license.
(2) Utah Code Annotated 58-12-295:
Board.

Physicians Licensing

The representative committee for persons who apply

for, or have been granted a license to practice medicine and
surgery in all branches under the Utah Medical Practice Act

shall be a committee of six physicians licensed under that
act and one lay member, to be known as the "Physicians
Licensing Board."

Notwithstanding Chapter 1, Title 58, the

concurrence of at least five members of the board is required
for the taking of any action under the Utah Medical Practice
Act.
(3) Utah Code Annotated, 58-12-30 makes it a third
degree felony to violate the Act and it also states several
exceptions to the Act.

The only exception relevant herein

is sub paragraph (5):
Any individual administering a domestic or
family remedy including those persons engaged
in the sale of vitamins, health food or health
food supplements, herb or other products of
nature, except drugs or medicines for which an
authorized prescription is required by law;
As stated above in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-12-2 9.5
of the Act it is a condition precedent that the concurrence
of at least five members of the board is necessary before
any action can be taken under the Act.
In the transcript there was never any showing that a
board was ever convened to discuss appellant's activities.
If there was such a meeting, there was no testimony showing
that at least five members of the board agreed that any
action should be taken against the appellant.
The respondent has violated the very rules that it is
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supposed to enforce.

Without any authorization from the

board, the State filed the action against appellant and
went to trial.

The State along with the public should be

held to the standard of complying with the provisions of the
Act.
The provisions of requiring board action before any
action can be taken are logical.

The board may be able to

solve problems or assist the State in solving problems
without the necessity of expensive civil and/or criminal
litigation.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT DID NOT PRACTICE MEDICINE
AS DEFINED IN THE ACT
The definition of the practice of medicine as stated
in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-12-26(4)(a)(b)(c) is set
forth as someone who diagnoses and treats, etc.; someone
who maintains an office to diagnose and treat, etc.; and
someone who holds himself out to be a doctor.

The trial

court ruled that the subparagraphs are to be treated disjunctively such that the practice of medicine is defined
conclusively pursuant to any of the three subparagraphs
(Record, page 80). The appellant thinks the trial court
erred in that the subparagraphs should be read conjunctively.
If the subparagraphs are to be read conjunctively there
was an incomplete showing that Mr. Hoffman either had an
office to diagnose or treat and there was no evidence that
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Mr. Hoffman held himself out to be a doctor (Record, pages
26 and 28). Further the jury instructions defined the
practice of medicine pursuant to Section 58-12-26(4) (a) only.
If the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
practice of medicine it would be reversible error because
of the content of the jury instructions.
POINT III
THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BROAD AND
VOID FOR VAGUENESS
If the trial court is correct and the practice of
medicine is defined only in Utah Code Annotated, Section
58-12-26(4)(a) then the Act is so broad that it renders the
practice of medicine as meaningless.

If one were to attempt

to draft a definition of the practice of medicine and intentionally attempt to be as overbroad as possible, subparagraph
(a) could certainly be the result.

Not only are real

illnesses and maladies included in the definition but . . .
11

[any] other condition, physical or mental, real or

imaginery."

The treatment or diagnosis of an imaginary

mental condition would be considered the practice of medicine.
In other words, every condition of the mind, real or imagined,
as well as every condition of the body is included in the
definition.
Such broadness of the Act renders it meaningless and
void.
basis.

Everyone would be practicing medicine on a regular
One would only need to be prepared to provide
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advice to help another's physical or mental disposition.
The person receiving this advice need not even be ill.
"You should rest/ 1 or

Anyone could be prepared to say:

"You should take a walk," or "You should go home early."
These could be construed as forms of advice to help
another's physical or mental disposition.

With such an

interpretation, the statute may be drawn to a host of other
ridiculous conclusions.
The above examples are indirect and subtLe, but are
still in violation of the Act.

The more direct activity

would clearly be the unlawful practice of medicine:

looking

into the eyes of another? looking into the throat or ears;
feeling the skin or forehead for fever; asking questions
about a health condition; procurring or offering aspirin,
alka seltzer or other over-the-counter remedies.

The use

of vaporizers, atomizers, thermometers and other
"instrumentalities" are considered the practice of medicine.
The above activities can only be performed by a person
licensed in the healing arts (a patent absurdity) or these
examples are exceptions to the practice of medicine as set
forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-12-30(5), supra.
In defendant's motion to dismiss the trial court was given
an example of this exception (Record, page 87). The Court
stated that this exception includes the diagnosis and
treatment cf family members by family members or the treatment of friends by friends even using commercial over-the-
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counter drugs.

The language of the exception does not

support the Court's conclusion.
There is very little Utah case law that has treated
the Act, therefore appellant hereinafter cites the actions
of other courts that have considered the same types of
statues.
The State of Texas had a similar statute to that of the
Act in its definition of the practice of medicine, Article
4510, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.

The three different

provisions of treating and diagnosing, etc. , having an
office to treat and diagnose, etc. and holding oneself out
to be a member of the healing arts are almost identical to
the Act.

In Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (1980),

the plaintiffs challenged the Texas statute that the field
of acupuncture was restricted to licensed physicians and thus
not made generally available through other practitioners.
The Court indicated that the State of Texas had an interest
to protect its citizens from improper medical services but
it could not infringe on their constitutional rights.
The Court, first of all, decided whether a constitutional
right existed to be protected.

It then indicated a long

line of cases defining the right to privacy such that a,
"right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain zones
of privacy does exist," Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
"and it encompasses those interests that can be deemed
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
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One such interest is the "interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions," Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977).

The Court then cites a long line of

cases that an individual may make personal decisions without
government interference.

The types of decisions are

marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing and
education.
The Court indicated that the foregoing decisions, "is
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
Bill of Rights but a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all

substantive

arbitrary

impositions and purposeless restraints ... and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must,
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgements"
Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961),
The Andrews Court at page 1046 cited additional cases
that set forth a traditional two prong test.

"It is the

individual making the decision and no one else who lives
with the pain and disease.

Second, it is impossible to

discuss the decision to obtain or reject medical treatment
without realizing its importance."

Two other cases were

cited highlighting the importance of medical decisions,
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 35 9
U.S. 1012 (1959), "the State cannot deny to any individual
the right to exercise a reasonable choice in the method of
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the treatment of his ills.

The root premise is the concept,

fundamental in American jurisprudence, that every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body."
The facts in the instant case differ from the facts
in Andrews such that the activities of Mr. Hoffman were
certainly less intrusive and much safer than acupuncture.
Mr. Hoffman did not make any injections; he did not perform
any surgery; he did not make a physical test or examination;
and he did not touch the informant's body.

It was claimed

that through sources of energy he evaluated the medical
condition of the informant.

He subsequently suggested that

she take pills that were natural compounds which were safe
and not prescription drugs.

Mr. Hoffman even offered to

return any monies the informant spent, if she was not happy
with the services performed.
The sources performed by Mr. Hoffman were safe and
nonintrusive.

As indicated in Andrews, acupuncture may be

unsafe in that the practitioner may place the needles in
the wrong place and the wrong depth and for the wrong period
of time.

However even with these apparent dangers the Fifth

Circuit ruled that the Texas statute was unconstitutional.
The activities of Mr. Hoffman that were of no harm to
the informant should be allowed.

The Act restricts the

activities of Mr. Hoffman and all the reasonably permissible
activities stated above.
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The State has an interest in protecting the public
against unsafe medical practices performed by inexperienced
practitioners.

However protecting the public by restricting

permissible safe activities is too much an intrusion of
governmenta1 interference.
The acceptable line of cases curtailing a constitutional
freedom necessitates a "compelling state interest" that
must be "narrowly drawn to express only" that interest,
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 686
(1977).

"It is not sufficient for the State to show that

the Act furthers a substantial state interest.

In pursuing

the important interest, the State cannot choose means that
unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected
activity.

Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be

drawn with precision, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963),
"and must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives"
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 631.

"And if there are other

reasonable ways to achieve these goals with a lesser burden
on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not
choose the way of greater interference.
it must choose "less drastic means."

If it acts at all,

Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479 (1960).
With a broad stroke of the legislative brush, the Act
has prohibited the activities and nonintrusive approach of
Mr. Hoffman along with the use of vaporizers, aspirin, cold
and flu remedies and thermometers administered by lay people.
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The Act's restriction of constitutional activities
through extreme government interference renders it unconstitutional.

The Act must fall because it is overbroad

on its face and the way it is applied.
POINT IV
THE ACT VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN
THAT IT RESTRICTS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A person not licensed to practice medicine in the
State of Utah cannot diagnose or treat any individual unless
he comes under one of the exceptions of Utah Code Annotated
58-12-30 (1) through (11). The exceptions deal with those
who have medical licenses in other states or those who are
currently seeking certification.

Subparagraph 4 treats the

good Samaritan activities of one who renders aid in an
emergency.

Subparagraph 5 treats the domestic or family

remedy issue and health foods.

Subparagraph 6 addresses

the healing aspects as part of a religion.
Other than those matters treated above, there are no
other exceptions.

The Act states that any other procedure

of diagnosing and treating must be done by a licensed
practitioner of the healing arts.

As has already been

stated, anyone who does not fit into the above exceptions
and who is not a licensed medical practitioner cannot
diagnose one's condition by observing, using a thermometer
or any other type of device or instrumentality to determine
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one's medical condition.

Also unlicensed medical practitioners

cannot use vaporizers, atomizers, aspirin or cold and flu
remedies on any other person.
The above innocuous activities would be prohibited from
the general population.

The foregoing would suggest that

the legislature does not feel that any citizen of the State
of Utah can be trusted to seek medical advice or treatment
except as outlined in the Act.

Unless the Act were strictly

complied with, even if the services rendered were completely
safe, fully disclosed and not fraudulent, a felony would
occur.

A Utah citizen does not have the freedom of choice

to seek alternative medical advice and therapy unless he goes
to a medical practitioner.

The legislature does not trust

the ability of the citizens of the State of Utah to be able
to seek out the diagnosis and treatment of their choice.
Said freedom of choice is similar to the plight of
patients in a terminal condition who are seeking the right
to die.

If a patient wants to "pull the plug" on his life

support system he generally must file a lawsuit to achieve
this right.

Courts seem to be siding with the patient's

request in exercising their will in being able to separate
themselves from their life support systems.
In this age of consumerism and high medical costs,
patients should be able to seek the lowest cost, safe treatment for their medical dollar.

Recently the Florida

legislature passed a statute allowing pharmacists and
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druggists to advise their customers concerning routine illnesses and injuries.

The legislature passed this provision

to help consumers lower their medical costs by not being
required to see a medical practitioner for routine and
mundane treatment.
The Utah Legislature could not respond similarly to
help consumers reduce their medical costs without a repeal
or a major revision of the Act.

As stated, the Act requires

us to see a physician for any medical ailment real or
imagined no matter how small.

Surely a citizen of the State

of Utah has the sense and wisdom to be able to choose the
medical treatment he desires, the cost of such medical
treatment and the procedure so long as the treatment is safe,
fully disclosed and is not fraudulent,
CONCLUSION
The Act should fall because it restricts normal
acceptable reasonable approaches to diagnosing and treating
medical conditions and unacceptable practices from which the
public should be protected such as surgery by an unlicensed
physician or a guarantee for cancer by paying a fee.
Act is so broad that its meaning is not known.

The

The State

must determine a less restrictive procedure to protect the
public from unscrupulous practitioners.
Dated this

day of

, 1986.
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Respectfully submitted,

6/mo
H. Delbert Welker
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
331 Rio Grande, Suite 102
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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